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In this paper we develop a method for investigating semi-device-independent randomness ex-
pansion protocols that was introduced in [Li et al. Phys. Rev. A 87, 020302(R) (2013)]. This
method allows to lower-bound, with semi-definite programming, the randomness obtained from ran-
dom number generators based on dimension witnesses. We also investigate the robustness of some
randomness expanders using this method. We show the role of an assumption about the trace of
the measurement operators and a way to avoid it. The method is also generalized to systems of
arbitrary dimension, and for a more general form of dimension witnesses, than it the previous paper.
Finally, we introduce a procedure of dimension witness reduction, which can be used to obtain from
an existing witness a new one with higher amount of certifiable randomness. The presented methods
finds an application for experiments [Ahrens et al. Phys. Rev. Lett. 112, 140401 (2014)].
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I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays information is one of the most important
resources. We can defeat the enemy in a war just ma-
nipulating his data. If we can guess the mechanism of
the generation of (pseudo-)random numbers used by a
casino, then we can efficiently cheat in gambling[1]. How-
ever, most of the so-called random number generators
has a deterministic algorithm inside. It is very difficult
to develop a reliable pseudo-random number generation
(PRNG) method. Although there are tests[2] that allow
to check whether a sequence of numbers conforms to a
particular probability distribution, we can never be sure
its security without the knowledge how the sequence was
generated.
One of the measures of randomness is so-called min-
entropy[3]. In particular, in the context of authentica-
tion, min-entropy is the probability of guessing the easi-
est key in a given distribution of keys[4]. If we know the
pseudo-random generating algorithm and the initial seed
(or some sequence of generated numbers), then the ran-
domness of such a source is equal to zero. All classical
PRNGs have this drawback.
On the other hand, quantum physics confuses philoso-
phers with randomness on its deepest level. This ran-
domness is unavoidable. We know that if certain observ-
ables (Bell operators, which are linear functions of ob-
served probabilities occurring in the experiment) attain
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certain thresholds, then the process must be intrinsically
random, or we would have to abandon some ideas that
are fundamental to all physical theories. Thus, values of
these observables guarantee that the results of performed
measurements are indeed random, no matter how does
the measuring apparatus work.
This way the idea of the quantum randomness certifica-
tion emerged[5]. If we want to be sure that the device we
are using does really produce random numbers, we per-
form Bell experiment, which is a kind of self testing. Such
an experiment involves at least two separated parties that
perform subsequent measurements with different settings
without any communication between them. After series
of such measurements, the collected data is used to esti-
mate the joint probabilities of the outcomes conditioned
on the settings used. The most prominent example of
Bell operator is so-called Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt
(CHSH)[6].
Because such self testing works independently of the
internal workings of the device used (in particular, the
exact form of the performed measurements is not impor-
tant), if the Bell inequality attains some value, we are
sure that the generated results are indeed random, even
if the device has been construed by a malevolent party.
The amount of the obtained secure randomness is pre-
cisely quantified by means of min-entropy[5, 7, 8]. This
approach, in which we do not trust the vendor of our
devices and draw conclusions only from the observed re-
sults, is called device-independent [9], referred further as
DI.
Still, Bell experiments are very difficult to do. They
require a high degree of precision and extremely high
detection efficiencies. So far loophole-free Bell experi-
ment has not been successfully performed. But when
2we allow to send a state from one part of the device to
another, then we do not have any non-locality, which is
crucial for that way of certification. It was shown that,
if we can bound the dimension of the communicated sys-
tem, we still may use this prepare and measure scheme
to certify the randomness[10]. Since we have to know
something about the construction of the device, this ap-
proach is called semi-device-independent [11, 12] (denoted
hereafter SDI ). This offers a good compromise between
security and experimental feasibility.
Currently all commercial quantum random generators
are based on the prepare and measure scheme, e.g. the
id Quantique’s[13] device Quantis, or the qStream by
Quintessence Labs [14]. These devices do not perform
any self testing, so we are forced to trust their vendors.
For this reason, methods for certifying randomness in
the prepare and measure scheme with the semi-device-
independent approach should be investigated. In this
framework analogs of Bell inequalities, called dimension
witnesses [10, 15–18], are used.
Before we proceed we should stress that what we call
random number generation is in fact randomness expan-
sion, the process that starts with some amount of ini-
tial randomness and uses it to obtain more of it. The
presented self testing procedure of the device also re-
quires some amount of randomness (in order to choose
the measurement settings in rounds of testing experi-
ments). Strictly speaking, all quantum random num-
ber generators that use Bell inequalities or dimension
witnesses to certify the randomness are randomness ex-
panders.
After generation of a string of bits with a certain
amount of min-entropy, it is possible to extract its ran-
domness what means using a certain algorithm to pro-
duce a shorter string with a larger min-entropy per
bit[19–21].
In our previous paper [22] we have investigated the
relation between random number expansion protocols
based on correlations occurring in the scenario where two
parties share an entangled state, and on protocols rely-
ing on the prepare and measure scheme. In this paper
we develop these ideas.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In the
section II we present scenario in which we are working.
Next, in sections III and IV, we give basic information
about Bell inequalities and dimension witnesses. Then,
in the section V, we recapitulate a heuristic method of ob-
taining a dimension witness from a Bell inequality. This
method was introduced in [22]. In sections VI and VII we
precisely state the conditions when the randomness cer-
tified by the violation of a Bell inequality lower-bounds
the randomness certified by a certain value of dimension
witness in the semi-device-independent scenario. In the
section VIII we investigate the properties of a certain
class of dimension witnesses and introduce a procedure
of dimension witness reduction, which can be used to
obtain from an existing witness a new one with higher
amount of certifiable randomness. In the section IX we
give examples of application of the presented methods.
The aims of this paper are as follows. We clarify the
methods from our previous paper [22] and give a tighter
lower bound on randomness. Using these methods we
obtain better dimension witnesses, in particular the one
based on the Braunstein-Caves Bell inequality [23]. We
also extend the applicability of the methods from [22] to
arbitrary dimensions.
II. MOTIVATION OF THIS PAPER
Suppose we are a developer of a random number gen-
erating device. Since consumers do not trust us, we are
interested in finding a way of certification for our de-
vice. Common method for the certification of quantum
random number generators that are based on measure-
ments on entangled particles is to estimate the value of
a certain Bell inequality that is attained in this device.
Still, it is too difficult to observe a loophole-free violation
of Bell inequality. Thus we prefer prepare and measure
protocols.
Both for prepare and measure protocols in the semi-
device-independent approach, and for correlation proto-
cols in the device-independent scheme, we would like to
define a value that measures how reliable is its particular
realization. As this value we take the expectation value
of the relevant dimension witness or Bell inequality, re-
spectively, attained in the relevant protocol. This value
is called a security parameter.
It is possible to consider several relations. One may ask
whether, having a protocol of one type, we can relate it to
some protocol of another type, in such a way that for the
same value of their security parameters the min-entropy
certified in one of them, is upper or lower bounded by
min-entropy certified by the other one. One may start
with a protocol based on a Bell inequality and construct
out of it a prepare and measure protocol certifying a rea-
sonable amount of min-entropy. This is useful since there
are many randomness expansion protocols based on Bell
inequalities[5, 8] and it is easy to obtain new ones [24].
Another situation is when we begin with some SDI
protocol and want to lower bound the certified random-
ness using efficient numerical methods from [25, 26], that
works in the device-independent approach. We present
a way to obtain a new Bell inequality with the property
that the DI protocol using it certifies at most as much
randomness as the SDI protocol.
As mentioned above, SDI protocols are much easier
to implement than the protocols based on entanglement.
For this reason it is useful to have a method that allows to
develop devices of the first kind with the help of the well
established knowledge about the devices of the second
type.
3III. BELL INEQUALITIES
We define for a DI protocol:
Definition 1 Let A, B, X, and Y be sets.
Probability distribution in DI scheme is a conditional
probability distribution P(A,B|X,Y ) such that
∀a∈A∀b∈B∀x∈X∀y∈Y P (a, b|x, y) = Tr
(
ρMaxM
b
y
)
,
where {{Max}a∈A}x∈X and {{M by}b∈B}y∈Y are sets of
POVMs on a Hilbert space H, and ρ is a density ma-
trix on H, and
∀a∈A∀b∈B∀x∈X∀y∈Y [Max ,M by ] = 0 if x 6= y. (1)
We denote this probability by
P[ρ, {{Max}a∈A}x∈X , {{M by}b∈B}y∈Y ].
If A = B = {0, 1}, then P(A,B|X,Y ) is called binary.
The set of all DI probability distributions for given A,
B, X and Y is denoted by P(A,B|X,Y ).
Let us take two sets, X and Y , that label the measure-
ment settings of Alice and Bob in DI scheme, and two
sets, A and B, that label their respective outcomes.
A Bell inequality is a linear function defined, in par-
ticular, for probability distributions P(A,B|X,Y ). It is
of the form
I(A,B,X, Y, {αa,b,x,y}, CI)[P(A,B|X,Y )] ≡
=
∑
a∈A
∑
b∈B
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
αa,b,x,yP (a, b|x, y) + CI , (2)
where αa,b,x,y, CI ∈ R. We omit P if it is obvious which
probability distribution is considered.
The constant term CI in a Bell inequality does not
change its properties. Still, we retain this general form,
both for Bell inequalities, and dimension witnesses in
the next section. In the following sections this allows to
keep the same maximal expected value when performing
a transformation leading from one expression to another.
A particular form of Bell inequality is the following
correlation form
Iˆ(X,Y, {αx,y}, CˆI)[P({0, 1}, {0, 1}|X,Y )] ≡
=
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
αˆx,yC(x, y) + CˆI ,
(3)
with αˆx,y, CˆI ∈ R, and
C(x, y) = P (0, 0|x, y)− P (0, 1|x, y)
− P (1, 0|x, y) + P (1, 1|x, y).
Obviously, the form (2) conforms the form (3) if, and
only if α0,0,x,y = α1,1,x,y = −α0,1,x,y = −α1,0,x,y = αˆx,y,
and P(A,B|X,Y ) is binary.
For given A, B, X , Y , x0 ∈ X , y0 ∈ Y , Bell inequality
I and s ∈ R we define the following terms:
Pguess(P(A,B|X,Y ), x0, y0) ≡ max
a∈A,b∈B
P (a, b|x0, y0)
H∞(P(A,B|X,Y ), x0, y0) ≡
− log2 (Pguess(P(A,B|X,Y ), x0, y0))
Hcert∞ (I, x0, y0, s) ≡
min
P(A,B|X,Y )∈P(A,B|X,Y )
H∞(P(A,B|X,Y ), x0, y0),
subject to I[P(A,B|X,Y )] ≥ s
The expression H∞(P(A,B|X,Y ), x0, y0) is called min-
entropy, and Hcert∞ (I, x0, y0, s) is the min-entropy certi-
fied by the value s of I.
IV. DIMENSION WITNESSES
For a SDI scheme, we have the following definition of
the allowed probability distribution
Definition 2 Let B¯, X¯, and Y¯ be sets, and H be a
Hilbert space of a finite dimension d.
A probability distribution in SDI scheme is a condi-
tional probability distribution Pd(B¯|X¯, Y¯ ) such that for
b ∈ B¯, x ∈ X¯ and y ∈ Y¯ we have P (b|x, y) = Tr (ρxM by),
where {ρx}x∈X¯ is a set of density matrices on H, and
{M by}b∈B¯ are POVMs on H for all y ∈ Y¯ .
We say that Pd is realized by sets {ρx}x∈X¯ and
{{M by}b∈B¯}y∈Y¯ , and denote it
Pd
[{ρx}x∈X¯ , {{M by}b∈B¯}y∈Y¯ ] .
If B¯ = {0, 1}, then Pd(B¯|X¯, Y¯ ) is called a binary prob-
ability distribution.
The set of all SDI probability distributions for given d,
B¯, X¯ and Y¯ is denoted by Pd(B¯|X¯, Y¯ ).
The set of all SDI probability distributions with restric-
tions that d = 2, B¯ = {0, 1} and ∀b∈{0,1}∀y∈Y¯ TrM by = 1
is denoted by P(P )(X¯, Y¯ ).
Let X¯ and Y¯ be sets labeling the settings of Alice and
Bob, in the SDI scheme, and let B¯ be a set of the out-
comes that Bob can obtain.
Dimension witnesses are linear functions of probability
distributions of the form
W (B¯, X¯, Y¯ , {βb,x,y}, CW )[Pd(B¯|X¯, Y¯ )] ≡
=
∑
b∈B¯
∑
x∈X¯
∑
y∈Y¯
βb,x,yP (b|x, y) + CW , (5)
where βb,x,y, CW ∈ R, and d ≥ 2.
If B¯ = {0, 1}, then the dimension witness is called bi-
nary. If ∀b∈B¯∀y∈Y¯
∑
x∈X¯ βb,x,y = 0, then the dimension
witness is called zero-summing.
4For given B¯, X¯ , Y¯ , x0 ∈ X¯ , y0 ∈ Y¯ , dimension witness
W , s ∈ R and d ≥ 2 we define the following terms:
Pguess(Pd(B¯|X¯, Y¯ ), x0, y0) ≡ max
b∈B¯
P (b|x0, y0) (6a)
H∞(Pd(B¯|X¯, Y¯ ), x0, y0) ≡ − log2
(
Pguess(Pd(B¯|X¯, Y¯ ), x0, y0)
)
P certguess(W,x0, y0, s, d) ≡ max
Pd(B¯|X¯,Y¯ )∈Pd(B¯|X¯,Y¯ )
max
b∈B¯
P (b|x0, y0),
subject to W [Pd(B¯|X¯, Y¯ )] ≥ s
(6b)
Hcert∞ (W,x0, y0, s, d) ≡ − log2
(
P certguess(W,x0, y0, s, d)
)
P cert(P )guess (W,x0, y0, s) ≡
max
Pd(B¯|X¯,Y¯ )∈P(P )(X¯,Y¯ ,s)
max
b∈B¯
P (b|x0, y0). (6c)
The expression H∞(Pd(B¯|X¯, Y¯ ), x0, y0) is called min-
entropy, and Hcert∞ (W,x0, y0, s) is the min-entropy cer-
tified by the value s of W (for the dimension d).
The following lemma summarizes some properties of
dimension witnesses.
Lemma 1 Let H be a Hilbert space of a dimension 2, and
let W be a binary dimension witness defined by certain
X¯, Y¯ , {βb,x,y} and CW .
Let {ρx}x∈X¯ ≡ S be a set of states on H, and
{{M0y ,M1y}}y∈Y ≡ M be a set of binary POVM on H.
Let s ≡W [P2(S,M)].
Then, the following implications hold:
1. If ∀y∈Y¯
∑
x β0,x,y =
∑
x β1,x,y, then there exists a
set of binary POVM on H, M˜ ≡ {{M˜0y , M˜1y}}y,
such that ∀y,bTr M˜ by = 1, and W [P2(S,M˜)] = s.
2. If
∑
b,x,y βb,x,y = 0, and ∀y,bTrM by = 1, then for
S˜ = {1 − ρx}x∈X¯, which is a set of states on H,
W [P2(S˜,M)] = −s.
3. If ∀y,bTrM by = 1, then there exist a set of pro-
jective measurements, M˜ ≡ {{Π0y,Π1y}}y∈Y¯ with
∀b∈B¯,y∈Y¯ Tr
(
Πby
)
= 1, such that W [P2(S,M˜)] ≥ s.
Proof.
1. Let us take y ∈ Y¯ . Let cy = 12
(
1− Tr(M0y )
)
, M˜0y =
M0y + cy1 , and M˜
1
y =M
1
y − cy1 . Obviously
M˜0y + M˜
1
y =M
0
y +M
1
y = 1 .
Now, we prove that ∀y,bM˜ by  0. There exist an
orthonormal basis {| 0y〉, | 1y〉} in that
M0y = v0| 0y〉〈0y |+ v1| 1y〉〈1y |,
and
M1y = (1− v0)| 0y〉〈0y |+ (1− v1)| 1y〉〈1y |,
where v0, v1 ∈ [0, 1]. We have cy = 12 (1− v0 − v1),
and 1 = | 0y〉〈0y |+ | 1y〉〈1y |. Thus
M˜0y =
1
2
(1 + v0 − v1)| 0〉〈0 |+ 1
2
(1 − v0 + v1)| 1〉〈1 |.
Since 1 + v0 − v1 ≥ 0 and 1− v0 + v1 ≥ 0, we have
M˜0y  0, and Tr M˜0y = 1. Similarly, we check that
M˜1y  0 and Tr M˜1y = 1.
Repeating this construction for all y ∈ Y¯ , we obtain
a set of POVM, M˜ ≡ {{M˜0y , M˜1y}}y∈Y¯ .
We have
Tr(ρxM˜
b
y) = P (b|x, y) + (−1)b · cy,
and thus
W [Pd(S,M˜)] =
∑
b,x,y
βb,x,y Tr(ρxM˜
b
y)
= s+
∑
y
cy
(∑
x
β0,x,y −
∑
x
β1,x,y
)
= s.
2. We have
W [P2(S˜,M)] =
∑
b,x,y
βb,x,y Tr
(
(1 − ρx)M by
)
=
∑
b,x,y
βb,x,y(1 − P (b|x, y))
=
∑
b,x,y
βb,x,y −
∑
b,x,y
βb,x,yP (b|x, y) = −s.
3. For any y ∈ Y¯ we have
M0y = λy| 0y〉〈0y |+ (1− λy)| 1y〉〈1y |,
and
M1y = (1− λy)| 0y〉〈0y |+ λy| 1y〉〈1y |,
for a certain basis {| 0y〉, | 1y〉}, λy ∈ [0, 1].
Let us define sy ≡
∑
b,x βb,x,yP (b|x, y). Denote∑
x
(β0,x,y Tr(ρx| 0y〉〈0y |) + β1,x,y Tr(ρx| 1y〉〈1y |))
by sy,0, and similarly∑
x
(β0,x,y Tr(ρx| 1y〉〈1y |) + β1,x,y Tr(ρx| 0y〉〈0y |))
by sy,1.
We have s =
∑
y sy, and
sy = λysy,0 + (1− λy)sy,1.
5If sy,0 ≥ sy,1, then we take M˜0y ≡ | 0y〉〈0y | and
M˜1y ≡ | 1y〉〈1y |, otherwise we take M˜0y ≡ | 1y〉〈1y |
and M˜1y ≡ | 0y〉〈0y |. For M˜ = {{M˜0y , M˜0y}}y∈Y¯ it
is easy to see that
W [P2(S,M˜)] =
∑
y
max(sy,0, sy,1) ≥
∑
y
sy = s.
The first statement in this lemma says that in the di-
mension 2 the condition that all measurement operators
have trace 1 is not restrictive with regards to the set of
values possible to attain. The second statement gives suf-
ficient conditions under which an operation of negation
of all states gives the same value of a dimension witness
but with opposite sign. The third statement, which may
be used to complement the first one, shows that under
certain conditions it is not restrictive to use only projec-
tive measurements in case when the values possible to be
attained are considered.
V. A HEURISTIC METHOD FOR OBTAINING
A DIMENSION WITNESS FROM A BELL
INEQUALITY
Consider the following Bell experiment. Suppose we
are given a Bell inequality of the form (2). Alice and
Bob share an entangled state. Alice chooses a measure-
ment setting x ∈ X , and obtains an outcome a ∈ A. For
each setting x and result a, we assign a conditional prob-
ability P (a|x). Alice’s measurement prepares some state
at Bob’s side. Next, Bob chooses a measurement setting
y ∈ Y , and obtains an outcome b ∈ B. The probability
that Bob gets b, knowing both the setting and the result
of Alice, is P (b|a, x, y).
We rewrite1 the joint conditional probability of a given
pair of results for a given pair of settings as P (a, b|x, y) =
P (b|a, x, y) ·P (a|x). Thus, defining x¯ ≡ (a, x), the initial
Bell inequality is transformed to the form of a dimension
witness (see the equation (5)), with βb,x¯,y ≡ βb,(a,x),y ≡
αa,b,x,y · P (a|x). We have B¯ = B, X¯ = A × X , and
Y¯ = Y .
The fact that it is possible to transform a Bell inequal-
ity into the form of a dimension witness, leads us to some
heuristic method to achieve an SDI protocol that certifies
a reasonable amount of randomness, once we have a DI
protocol. We get the SDI protocol if, instead of measur-
ing on Alice’s side, she gets ”the outcome” as a part of
her input with the probability distribution P (a|x). Thus,
we obtain a pair (a, x) that we use as an index of the state
to be send. This way, the device on the side of Alice pre-
pares one of |X¯ | = |A| · |X | states ρ(a,x). Bob still has
|Y¯ | = |Y | measurement settings.
1 We are using here the no-signaling principle.
VI. LOWER-BOUNDS FOR DIMENSION
WITNESSES VIA SEMI-DEFINITE PROGRAMS
In this section we construct a sequence of devices that
shows that the randomness certified by an SDI protocol
can be lower bounded by the randomness certified in a
certain DI protocol minus log2 d.
We consider a deviceD0 that we get from an untrusted
vendor, and that consists of two black boxes. Its only pa-
rameter that we can verify (or trust), is the dimension of
the message send from one part of it, to the another one.
We assume, that the device cannot communicate with the
world outside the laboratory. The black box on Alice’s
side has buttons with labels x ∈ X¯ and emits one of the
states of the dimension d from the set of states {ρx}x∈X¯ .
The states are unknown to us, and are of arbitrary, pos-
sibly mixed, form. The black box on Bob’s side has but-
tons with labels y ∈ Y¯ and, after receiving the qubit from
Alice’s black box, it performs one of the measurements
given by POVMs from the set{{M by}b∈B¯}y∈Y¯ . We do not
know, how the measurements are performed. This de-
scription is semi-device independent, since we know only
the dimension d.
Suppose we are given a dimension witness W (of the
form (5)) that achieves in the experiments on the device
D0 the expected value W0. We denote the conditional
probability of obtaining the outcome b when the chosen
settings are x and y, by PD0(b|x, y).
The device D0 is not trusted, but it is possible to con-
sider another device, D1, that consists of two parts, with
buttons labeled by x ∈ X¯ and y ∈ Y¯ on the Alice’s side
and on the Bob’s side, respectively. The parts are sharing
a maximally entangled state of the dimension d. The part
on the Alice’s side performs some measurement, depend-
ing on the chosen input x. This measurement projects
the Alice’s part of the singlet on the state ρx that is the
same as the relevant state from the device D0. If the
projection succeeded, which happens with the probabil-
ity 1
d
, then the device returns a = 0 and changes the state
on the Alice’s side into the state ρx, otherwise it returns
a = 1. Since the shared state is a singlet, this measure-
ment prepares the same d-dimensional state on the Bob’s
side. Then he performs the same POVM {M by}b∈B¯ as the
device D0, and returns the outcome b ∈ B¯.
The probability that Alice gets the outcome a with
the setting x, and simultaneously Bob gets the outcome
b with the setting y is denoted by PD1(a, b|x, y). It is
easy to see, that PD0(b|x, y) = d · PD1(0, b|x, y).
Now let us consider another device, D2. It has the
same interface like D1, but the conditions on the inter-
nal working are relaxed, viz. we do not assume any-
thing about the performed measurements, and Alice’s
and Bob’s parts are allowed to share any, possibly en-
tangled, state ρ of an arbitrary dimension. The prob-
ability of obtaining the outcomes a and b with given
pair of settings x and y for Alice and Bob, respectively,
are denoted by PD2(a, b|x, y). We apply a constraint
∀x∈XPD2(0|x) = 1d , where PD2(a|x) is the probability
6of getting the outcome a by Alice with the setting x with
the device D2.
Obviously, all the conditional probability distributions
that are possible to be obtained by the device D1 (and
thus also by the device D0), are also possible to be ob-
tained by this device. Note that this description is fully
device-independent, and that there are semi-definite pro-
grams in the NPA hierarchy [25, 26] that efficiently ap-
proximate the probability distributions of the device D2.
Since the device D2 is a relaxed version of the initial
device D0, if both of them have the same value of the
relevant security parameters, then the certified amount
of min-entropy generated by the device D2 gives a lower
bound of the min-entropy certified to be generated by
the device D0.
We recapitulate the above results in the following the-
orem
Theorem 1 Let B = B¯, X = X¯ and Y = Y¯ be sets. Let
us take s ∈ R, d ≥ 2, a Bell inequality I of the form (2),
and a dimension witness W of the form (5), satisfying
βb,x,y = d · α0,b,x,y.
Let Pd,SDI(s) be a subset of Pd(B¯|X¯, Y¯ ) with d ≥ 2
(see the definition 2) that satisfies W = s.
Let PDI(s) be a set of all probability distribution de-
fined by P (b|x, y) ≡ d · P (0, b|x, y), where P(A,B|X,Y )
is a device-independent probability distribution such that
I[P(A,B|X,Y )] = s, with A = {0, 1}.
Then Pd,SDI(s) ⊆ PDI(s).
This way we obtain a way to get a relation between
Bell inequalities and dimension witnesses with the prop-
erty that the amount of randomness certified by a Bell
inequality lower-bounds the amount of randomness cer-
tified by the relevant dimension witness. One of key fea-
tures of the set PDI is that it can be efficiently approx-
imated using semi-definite programming with the NPA
hierarchy.
From the definition of PDI(B|X,Y ), namely using
P (b|x, y) = d · P (0, b|x, y), we get that the certified min-
entropy of SDI protocol is lower-bounded by the one of
the DI protocol minus log2 d. Notable property of the
method is that we obtain a bound for any dimension of
the communicated system changing only a value of the
linear bound.
The figure 1 shows an example of application of the
theorem 1.
VII. BINARY ZERO-SUMMING DIMENSION
WITNESSES
In this section the properties of binary zero-summing
dimension witnesses are investigated. Recall that a di-
mension witness of the form given by the equation (5) is
called zero-summing if ∀b∈B¯∀y∈Y¯
∑
x∈X¯ βb,x,y = 0, and
binary if B¯ = {0, 1}. The reason to examine them is that
it is possible to obtain a tighter semi-definite relaxations
for this class of dimension witnesses.
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FIG. 1. (Color on-line) Lower-bounds via SDP on the cer-
tified randomness for a dimension witness obtained from the
CGLMP inequality (see the equation(17) in section IX) using
the methods from the section VI for different values of the
dimension d.
Let us start with a binary zero-summing dimension
witness W = W ({0, 1}, X¯, Y¯ , {βb,x,y}, CW ) that is used
to certify the randomness generated by measuring the
state x0 ∈ X¯ with the measurement setting y0 ∈ Y¯ . Let
{ρx}x∈X¯ and {{M0y ,M1y}}y∈Y¯ be the states and mea-
surements that maximize the guessing probability (see
the equation (6a)) of the generated bits by the untrusted
vendor.
First note that the value of the dimension witness does
not change if, for arbitrary y ∈ Y¯ , the measurement is
changed to {M0y + c1 ,M1y − c1 }, where c is such that
the spectrum of the operators remains in the range [0, 1].
Thus, since the potential adversary is interested in in-
creasing the probability of a particular outcome of the
measurement y0 as much as possible, the form of these
measurements that maximizes his guessing probability is
the following: [
1 0
0 1− δ
]
,
[
0 0
0 δ
]
(7)
By the lemma 1.1 and 1.3 it is not restrictive for the
vendor to use only projectors of trace 1 for the measure-
ments different than y0.
The strategy of using a measurement of the form (7) for
the setting y0, and projectors of trace 1 for all remaining
measurements is equivalent to using the following mixed
strategy. In δ cases, a projective measurement of trace 1
is used for the measurement y0 (we call this strategy: P),
and in 1 − δ cases the outcome is deterministic - this is
referred hereafter as a deterministic strategy, or simply:
D. For the remaining measurements the same projective
measurements of trace 1 are used in both cases.
The guessing probability for the strategy D is 1, and for
the strategy P is p, thus the average guessing probability
is
(1− δ) + δ · p. (8)
7In the case of a zero-summing dimension witness with
the deterministic strategy, measurements with the setting
y0 give no contribution to the value of the witness. Thus
the certification of the randomness with the dimension
witness
W =W ({0, 1}, X¯, Y¯ , {βb,x,y}, CW )
when the vendor of the device uses the mixed strategy
is, after applying certain affine transformation (see equa-
tion (8)), equivalent to the certification with a dimension
witness
W(δ,y0)({0, 1}, X¯, Y¯ , {β˜b,x,y}, CW )
with β˜b,x,y defined in the equation (9), and the strategy
P, where the guessing probability of Eve is given by the
equation (8).
Since the vendor may choose any δ ∈ [0, 1] that allows
to observe the required value of the dimension witness
W when calculating lower-bound on the certified min-
entropy, the worst case should be considered for a par-
ticular situation.
This way, we have proved the following
Lemma 2 Let W = W ({0, 1}, X¯, Y¯ , {βb,x,y}, CW ) be a
binary zero-summing dimension witness, x0 ∈ X¯, and
y0 ∈ Y¯ . Let W(δ,y0) = W(δ,y0)({0, 1}, X¯, Y¯ , {β˜b,x,y}, CW )
be a dimension witness, where
β˜b,x,y =
{
βb,x,y if y 6= y0
δ · βb,x,y if y = y0 . (9)
Then
P certguess(W,x0, y0, s, 2) =
max
δ∈[0,1]
(
(1− δ) + δ · P cert(P )guess (W(δ,y0), x0, y0, s)
)
where P certguess(W,x0, y0, s, 2) and P
cert(P )
guess (W,x0, y0, s) are
defined in equations (6b) and (6c).
The consequence of restricting the vendor to the di-
mension 2 and measurements of trace 1 is that the follow-
ing holds for all x ∈ X¯ and y ∈ Y¯ , and for any b ∈ {0, 1}:
Tr(¬ρxM¬by ) = Tr((1 − ρx)(1 −M by)) =
1− Tr(M by) + Tr(ρxM by) = Tr(ρxM by) = P (b|x, y),
(10)
where ¬ρx ≡ 1 − ρx. This relation allows to refine the
relaxation given in the section VI.
Let us consider a device D1′ that models the strat-
egy P by sharing the singlet state, projecting on states
{ρx}x∈X¯ on the side of Alice, and measuring on the side
of Bob with measurements of trace 1, {{M0y ,M1y}}y∈Y¯ .
In contrast to the device D1, if the projection on a state
ρx for any x ∈ X¯ fails, then the prepared state is ¬ρx. It
is easy to see that, by the equation (10), the probabilities
obtained in this device are constrained by the following
relation:
P (a, b|x, y) = P (¬a,¬b|x, y) (11)
for all a, b ∈ {0, 1}, x ∈ X , and y ∈ Y . A further relax-
ation, analogous to the one leading from the deviceD1 to
the device D2, allows to obtain a device D2′, satisfying
the relation (11), that can be modeled by a semi-definite
program in the device-independent scheme.
This way we have proved the following theorem
Theorem 2 Let X = X¯ and Y = Y¯ be sets. Let us
take s ∈ R, a Bell inequality I of the form (2), and a
binary zero-summing dimension witness W of the form
(5), satisfying βb,x,y = α0,b,x,y = α1,¬b,x,y.
Let P(P )SDI(s) be a subset of P(P )(X¯, Y¯ ) (see the def-
inition 2) containing those probabilities P2({0, 1}|X¯, Y¯ )
that satisfies W [P2] = s.
Let PDI,cond(s) be a set probability distributions de-
fined by P (b|x, y) ≡ P (0, b|x, y) + P (1,¬b|x, y), where
P(A,B|X,Y ) is a device-independent probability distri-
bution that satisfies I[P(A,B|X,Y )] = s and the relation
(11).
Then P(P )SDI(s) ⊆ PDI,cond(s).
It is straightforward to check that the following lemma
holds:
Lemma 3 Let a, b ∈ {0, 1}, and let us assume that
P (a, b|x, y) + P (a,¬b|x, y) = P (a|x, y) = P (a|x), and
P (a, b|x, y) + P (¬a, b|x, y) = P (b|x, y) = P (b|y),
i.e. the no-signaling principle, and that the outcomes of
Bob are binary, namely
P (b|a, x, y) + P (¬b|a, x, y) = 1. (13)
Then we have the following implications:
1. If P (a, b|x, y) = P (¬a,¬b|x, y) holds, then we have
P (a|x) = 12 and P (b|a, x, y) + P (b|¬a, x, y) = 1.
2. If P (b|a, x, y) + P (b|¬a, x, y) = 1 holds, then we
have P (b|a, x, y) = P (¬b|¬a, x, y).
3. If P (a|x) = 12 and P (b|a, x, y) = P (¬b|¬a, x, y)
hold, then we have P (a, b|x, y) = P (¬a,¬b|x, y).
From this lemma we get that the condition P (a, b|x, y) =
P (¬a,¬b|x, y) is more restrictive than P (a|x) = 12 . From
this we conjecture that for any s
P
(P )
SDI(s) ⊆ PDI,cond(s) ⊆ PDI(s),
where the sets are defined in theorems 1 and 2. Thus
the theorem 2 refines the results of the theorem 1 for the
case of binary zero-summing dimension witnesses.
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FIG. 2. (Color on-line) Lower-bounds via SDP on min-entropy certified by different Bell inequalities for different levels of noise.
Several situations are considered. This illustrates the relations summarized in the lemma 3. Reduced Bell inequalities refer to
lower-bounds on reduced symmetric dimension witnesses (see the section VIII) for the strategy P (see the section VII). These
Bell operators are given by formulas (27), (22), (18) and (28). We observe that using reduced dimension witnesses provides
an advantage in the terms of certifiable randomness. Bell operators that may be used for lower-bounding the randomness full
symmetric dimension witnesses are given by formulas (26), (23), (19) and (31). Recall that the theorem 1 and a remark below
it, the lower-bound for the randomness of a dimension witness is given by the randomness of the Bell inequality minus log
2
d.
This plot refers to the case with d = 2, thus these methods that give value below log
2
2 = 1 are not feasible for the given value
of p.
Figures 2 and 3 show examples lower- and upper-
bounds for min-entropy certified when the untrusted ven-
dor uses the strategy P. Figures 4 and 5 show lower-
bounds for the certified min-entropy in case when the un-
trusted vendor uses the mixed strategy. All lower-bounds
are calculated via semi-definite programs with the NPA
hierarchy, using interior point method with the SeDuMi
solver [30, 31]. The upper-bounds have been obtained by
finding explicit representations of states and measure-
ments. This optimization has been carried over pure
states and projective measurements, and is not guar-
antied to reach global minima, in contrast to the semi-
definite programming method.
Interestingly, in all protocols considered in the figure 5,
it is optimal for the adversary to use δ = 1, i.e. using the
mixed strategy gives no gain comparing to the strategy
P.
VIII. SYMMETRIC DIMENSION WITNESSES
Let us introduce the following definition:
Definition 3 A dimension witness W of the form (5)
with the set of Alice’s settings X¯ of even size, and
B¯ = {0, 1}, is symmetric, if there exist an surjective au-
tomorphism φ : X¯ → X¯ with φ(x) 6= x and βb,x,y =
−βb,φ(x),y = −β¬b,x,y.
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FIG. 3. (Color on-line) Numerical lower-bounds via SDP and upper-bounds on the randomness certified for the strategy P
(see the section VII), for both reduced (see the section VIII) and full certificates and different Bell operators and dimension
witnesses. Here we observe even more advantage for the reduced versions.
For a set χ¯ ⊂ X¯ we define
Wχ¯ ≡
∑
b∈{0,1}
∑
x∈χ¯
∑
y∈Y¯
βb,x,yP (b|x, y).
A set χ¯ ⊂ X¯ satisfying χ¯∩φ(χ¯) = ∅, and χ¯∪φ(χ¯) = X¯
is called a half of X¯.
If a set χ¯ is a half, then Wχ¯ is called a dimension
witness reduced with respect to χ. φ and χ may be omitted
if it is obvious which automorphism or set is considered.
If a dimension witness is symmetric, then there is a way
to reduce the size of X¯ , whilst the obtained dimension
witness can certify at least the same amount of random-
ness, as the initial one.
The following theorem is an immediate result of the
theorem 2 and the lemma 1.2:
Theorem 3 For a SDI protocol using the strategy P with
a symmetric dimension witness that attains the value of
the security parameter s on a Hilbert space of the dimen-
sion 2 and certifies the randomness r, the same value is
still possible to be attained and certifies at least the same
randomness, if we impose an additional condition that
ρx = 1 − ρφ(x), which implies P (b|x, y) = P (¬b|φ(x), y).
Simply speaking this theorem says that symmetric di-
mension witnesses posses some kind of degree of freedom
that does not increase the range of values possible to be
attained, but allows adversary to “distribute” the value
of the witness among the states in such a way that mis-
leads about the reliability of the device. The proposed
method shows a way to remove this freedom.
A. Obtaining and reduction of a symmetric
dimension witness
This subsection shows how to transform a symmetric
dimension witness to a reduced one.
It is possible to use a known Bell inequality to obtain
a new dimension witness. Examples of such protocols,
T 2, T 3, BC3 and modCHSH , are described below in
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FIG. 4. (Color on-line) Lower-bounds via SDP on the certified randomness in semi-device-independent scenario for both
reduced dimension witnesses (see the section VIII) when the untrusted vendor uses the mixed strategy with different values of
the parameter δ (see the section VII). If certain value of a dimension witness is impossible to be achieved with given δ, then,
since the eavesdropper cannot mislead us this way, the value 1 is put.
the section IX. From a Bell inequality of the form
∑
x,y
α˙x,y
(
1
2p0,x
(P (0, 0|x, y)− P (0, 1|x, y))
+
1
2p1,x
(P (1, 1|x, y)− P (1, 0|x, y))
) (14)
(where p0,x+p1,x = 1), using the method from the section
V, we obtain a symmetric dimension witness of the form
(5), with β0,x,y = α˙x,y, and β1,x,y = −α˙x,y. For the new
SDI protocol, we assume that a is chosen randomly by
Alice, with the distribution P (a|x) ≡ pa,x.
Note that Bell inequalities in the correlation form (see
the equation (3)), are a special case of the inequalities
of the form (14) with pa,x =
1
2 and α˙x,y = α¯x,y, which
means that it is always possible to obtain a symmetric di-
mension witness from a correlation-based Bell inequality.
Then C(x, y) turns into
W ′(x, y) ≡ 1
2
(P (0|(0, x), y) + P (1|(1, x), y)
−P (1|(0, x), y)− P (0|(1, x), y))
= P (0|(0, x), y)− P (0|(1, x), y).
(15)
It is easy to see, that a dimension witness which is a
linear combination of expressions (15), is symmetric.
We define φ((a, x)) ≡ (¬a, x) and χ ≡ {(0, x) :
x ∈ X} ⊆ {0, 1} × X . The condition P (b|(a, x), y) =
P (¬b|(¬a, x), y) allows us to take
W (x, y) ≡ 2P (0|(0, x), y)− 1 ≡ 2P (0|x, y)− 1, (16)
instead of W ′(x, y) from the equation (15), which is an
example of the reduction.
Note that using the method of reduction of a symmet-
ric dimension witness the number of states used by Alice
is reduced twice without loss of of ability to certify both
the randomness and the dimension.
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FIG. 5. (Color on-line) Lower-bounds via SDP on the certified randomness for both reduced and symmetric dimension witnesses
(see the section VIII) when the untrusted vendor uses the mixed strategy with the optimal value of the parameter δ (see the
section VII) which occurs to be 1 in all cases.
On the other hand every symmetric dimension wit-
ness is a linear combination of expressions D(x, y) ≡
P (0|x, y)−P (1|x, y) that refers in DI scenario to the ex-
pression 2P (0, 0|x, y)− 2P (0, 1|x, y). Assuming that the
dimension of the Hilbert space is 2, and the eavesdropper
uses the strategy P, we get from the equation (11) that
2P (0, 0|x, y)− 2P (0, 1|x, y) = C(x, y).
IX. EXAMPLES
In this section we give five examples of applications of
the methods presented above. Four of them, B, C, D,
and E, concern Bell inequalities in the correlation form
and symmetric dimension witnesses.
All figures are plotted with respect to a relative param-
eter p. The value p = 1 refers the case when the maximal
value of the relevant Bell inequality or dimension witness
is achieved. Values p < 1 relate to the situation with
noise, when the attained value is equal to the maximum
multiplied by p.
A. CGLMP
In the first example we start with CGLMP inequal-
ity introduced in [29]. Both Alice and Bob have two
measurement settings with three outcomes. It has the
following form
P (0, 0|1, 1)− P (0, 2|1, 1) + P (0, 0|1, 2)− P (0, 2|1, 2)
− P (1, 0|1, 1) + P (1, 1|1, 1)− P (1, 0|1, 2) + P (1, 1|1, 2)
− P (2, 1|1, 1) + P (2, 2|1, 1)− P (2, 1|1, 2) + P (2, 2|1, 2)
− P (0, 0|2, 1) + P (0, 1|2, 1) + P (0, 0|2, 2)− P (0, 2|2, 2)
− P (1, 1|2, 1) + P (1, 2|2, 1)− P (1, 0|2, 2) + P (1, 1|2, 2)
+ P (2, 0|2, 1)− P (2, 2|2, 1)− P (2, 1|2, 2) + P (2, 2|2, 2).
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Using the heuristic method from the section V we obtain
the following dimension witness:
P (0|1, 1)− P (2|1, 1) + P (0|1, 2)− P (2|1, 2)
− P (0|2, 1) + P (1|2, 1)− P (0|2, 2) + P (1|2, 2)
− P (1|3, 1) + P (2|3, 1)− P (1|3, 2) + P (2|3, 2)
− P (0|4, 1) + P (1|4, 1) + P (0|4, 2)− P (2|4, 2)
− P (1|5, 1) + P (2|5, 1)− P (0|5, 2) + P (1|5, 2)
+ P (0|6, 1)− P (2|6, 1)− P (1|6, 2) + P (2|6, 2).
(17)
Applying the method from the section VI, we get the fol-
lowing expression, which may be used in a semi-definite
program:
P (0, 0|1, 1)− P (0, 2|1, 1) + P (0, 0|1, 2)− P (0, 2|1, 2)
− P (0, 0|2, 1) + P (0, 1|2, 1)− P (0, 0|2, 2) + P (0, 1|2, 2)
− P (0, 1|3, 1) + P (0, 2|3, 1)− P (0, 1|3, 2) + P (0, 2|3, 2)
− P (0, 0|4, 1) + P (0, 1|4, 1) + P (0, 0|4, 2)− P (0, 2|4, 2)
− P (0, 1|5, 1) + P (0, 2|5, 1)− P (0, 0|5, 2) + P (0, 1|5, 2)
+ P (0, 0|6, 1)− P (0, 2|6, 1)− P (0, 1|6, 2) + P (0, 2|6, 2).
The certified randomness for CGLMP is shown in the
figure 1.
B. BC3
In the second example we start with a well known
Braunstein-Caves inequality (denoted below BC3, it is
a Bell inequality in the form (3)) with three settings for
each of the two parties, and convert it to a symmetric
dimension witness with six prepared states. After re-
duction, we will obtain a dimension witness with three
states, and show that the lower bounding Bell inequality
is identical to the original BC3.
BC3 inequality is of the form
BC3 ≡ C(1, 1) + C(1, 2) + C(2, 2)
+ C(2, 3) + C(3, 3)− C(3, 1), (18)
with δ = 1. For BC3 we have x, y ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Thus
we obtain a symmetric dimension witness with six states
prepared by Alice and three measurements performed by
Bob.
The explicit form of this symmetric dimension witness
is
P (0|(0, 1), 1)− P (0|(1, 1), 1) + P (0|(0, 1), 2)
− P (0|(1, 1), 2) + P (0|(0, 2), 2)− P (0|(1, 2), 2)
+ P (0|(0, 2), 3)− P (0|(1, 2), 3) + P (0|(0, 3), 3)
− P (0|(1, 3), 3)− P (0|(0, 3), 1) + P (0|(1, 3), 1).
Using the method for symmetric dimension witnesses
from the section VIII, this may be transformed into a di-
mension witness with three states. We define φ((a, x)) ≡
(¬a, x) and χ ≡ {(0, x) : x ∈ X} ⊆ {0, 1} ×X .
The explicit form of this reduced dimension witness is
2 (P (0|1, 1) + P (0|1, 2) + P (0|2, 2)
+P (0|2, 3) + P (0|3, 3)− P (0|3, 1))− 4.
Now, using the theorem 2, we go from this reduced di-
mension witness back to the Bell inequality that gives
a lower-bounding relation. Assuming P (a, b|x, y) =
P (¬a,¬b|x, y), we get that the lower-bounding Bell in-
equality is exactly the initial Braunstein-Caves inequal-
ity. If we use a full dimension witness, then the Bell
inequality used in lower-bounding with the theorem 2 is
1
2
(C(1, 1) + C(1, 2) + C(2, 2) + C(2, 3)
+ C(3, 3)− C(3, 1) + C(4, 1) + C(4, 2)
+C(5, 2) + C(5, 3) + C(6, 3)− C(6, 1)) ,
(19)
where (0, 1) ≡ 1, (0, 2) ≡ 2, (0, 3) ≡ 3, (1, 1) ≡ 4, (1, 2) ≡
5, and (1, 3) ≡ 6.
In the figure 2c, the min-entropies certified with the
Bell inequality BC3 with different additional conditions
are plotted. The figure 3c shows lower-bounds on the
min-entropy certified in this SDI protocol, obtained by
theorem 1 from the NPA hierarchy with additional con-
dition P (a, b|x, y) = P (¬a,¬b|x, y). These values assume
that the untrusted vendor uses the strategy P (see the
section VII). Plots relevant to the mixed strategy are
shown on figures 4c and 5c.
C. T3
The third example starts with a dimension witness
based on 3 to 1 quantum random access code [15, 27],
and relates it, and its reduced version, to two Bell in-
equalities, where the second one is T 3 introduced in [28].
In 3 to 1 quantum random access code Alice encodes
three bits by sending one of the 23 states to Bob, who
tries to guess one of them, performing one of three mea-
surements. The average success probability of correctly
guessing an arbitrarily chosen bit is directly related to
the value of the following dimension witness:∑
x∈X¯,y∈Y¯
(−1)xyP (0|x, y), (20)
where X¯ = {000, . . . , 111}, Y¯ = {0, 1, 2}. Its maximal
value attainable with qubits is 4
√
3.
Taking φ(x) = ¬x (negation is meant here as bit-wise),
X¯ = {00, 01, 10, 11} and Y¯ = Y¯ , we get the following
reduced dimension witness
P (0|00, 0) + P (0|01, 0) + P (0|10, 0) + P (0|11, 0)
+ P (0|00, 1) + P (0|00, 2) + P (0|01, 1)− P (0|01, 2)
− P (0|10, 1) + P (0|10, 2)− P (0|11, 1)− P (0|11, 2).
(21)
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From this dimension witness, using the method from the
section VIII, we get the following Bell operator:
C(1, 1) + C(2, 1) + C(3, 1) + C(4, 1)
+ C(1, 2) + C(1, 3) + C(2, 2)− C(2, 3)
− C(3, 2) + C(3, 3)− C(4, 2)− C(4, 3).
(22)
If we do not reduce the dimension witness and use the
formula (20) directly, we get the following Bell operator:
T 3′ ≡1
2
(C(1, 1)− C(5, 1) + C(2, 1)− C(6, 1)
+ C(3, 1)− C(7, 1) + C(4, 1)− C(8, 1)
+ C(1, 2)− C(5, 2) + C(1, 3)− C(5, 3)
+ C(2, 2)− C(6, 2)− C(2, 3) + C(6, 3)
− C(3, 2) + C(7, 2) + C(3, 3)− C(7, 3)
−C(4, 2) + C(8, 2)− C(4, 3) + C(8, 3)) .
(23)
The Bell operator defined in the equation (22) is the one
used in [22, 24, 28].
It is possible to calculate a lower-bound on the certified
min-entropy, Hcert∞ (T 3, x0, y0, s, d), with x0 = 1, y0 = 1
using the theorem 2, i.e. via a semi-definite relaxation
with a minimization on higher level over δ ∈ [0, 1].
The figure 2b shows the min-entropies certified with
the Bell inequality T 3 for different additional condi-
tions. In the figure 3b lower-bounds on the certified min-
entropy obtained by theorem 1 from the NPA hierarchy
with additional condition P (a, b|x, y) = P (¬a,¬b|x, y)
are plotted. These values assume that the untrusted ven-
dor uses the strategy P (see the section VII). Figures 4b
and 5b contains the relevant data for the mixed strategy.
D. T2
A simple Bell inequality is obtained from the symmet-
ric dimension witness of the 2 to 1 QRAC used in [15, 17].
It has the following form
W ′(1, 1) +W ′(1, 2) +W ′(2, 1)−W ′(2, 2), (24)
where W ′ is defined in the equation (15) and δ = 1. The
reduced form of this dimension witness is
W (1, 1) +W (1, 2) +W (2, 1)−W (2, 2), (25)
where W is defined by the equation (16) and δ = 1. Ro-
bustness of the reduced version has been already inves-
tigated in [22], in the figure 4. The randomness certified
by these two dimension witnesses is lower-bounded by
the values obtained with the following two Bell inequal-
ities. For the dimension witness defined in the equation
(24), we use a Bell inequality
1
2
(C(1, 1) + C(1, 2) + C(2, 1)− C(2, 2)
+C(3, 1) + C(3, 2) + C(4, 1)− C(4, 2)) ,
(26)
and for the dimension witness from the equation (25),
T 2 ≡ C(1, 1) + C(1, 2) + C(2, 1)− C(2, 2). (27)
The operator defined in the equation (27) is exactly the
CHSH Bell operator. Lower bounds for this case are
shown in Figs 2a, 3a, 4a and 5a.
The reduced witness (25) has recently been experimen-
tally realized [32]. The values obtained in this experiment
refer to p = 0.974 (5.51 in the scaling used there) and
p = 0.984 (5.56), concluded therein to certify 0.0595 and
0.082 bits of randomness, respectively. If the reduction
had not been performed, then only 0.0567 and 0.0305
would have been certified.
E. modCHSH
In [24] the following Bell operator is investigated:
modCHSH ≡ C(1, 2) + C(1, 3)
+ C(2, 1) + C(2, 2)− C(2, 3). (28)
This Bell operator is similar in the form to the dimen-
sion witness introduced in [16]. Since the relevant Bell
inequality is very robust in certifying the randomness,
the dimension witness with randomness lower-bounded
by it, may also be expected to be robust. Assuming
P (a|x) = 12 , we turn it into the following dimension wit-
ness
W ′(1, 2)+W ′(1, 3)+W ′(2, 1)+W ′(2, 2)−W ′(2, 3). (29)
Since this dimension witness is symmetric, we follow the
steps which lead from the expression (15), to the expres-
sion (16), to obtain the following reduced dimension wit-
ness
W (1, 2) +W (1, 3) +W (2, 1) +W (2, 2)−W (2, 3). (30)
If we start with the dimension witness defined in the
equation (29), and do not use the symmetry, we get the
following lower-bounding Bell inequality
1
2
(C(1, 2) + C(1, 3) + C(2, 1) + C(2, 2)− C(2, 3)
+C(3, 2) + C(3, 3) + C(4, 1) + C(4, 2)− C(4, 3)) .
(31)
The dimension witness from the equation (29) lower-
bounds the dimension witness from the equation (30),
and thus both are lower-bounded (in the sense of the the-
orem 1 and the conjecture below it) by the Bell inequality
from the equation (31), but only the second dimension
witness is proved to be lower-bounded by modCHSH
(see the equation (28)). Lower-bounds for this set of DI
and SDI protocols are shown in Figs 2d, 3d, 4d, and 5d.
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X. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we explained in more details the ideas
from our previous paper [22]. In particular all steps of
the proof of the theorem 1 were provided. A tighter
bound, using condition P (a, b|x, y) = P (¬a,¬b|x, y) in
DI scheme, has been introduced. We have presented a
new method of dimension witness reduction and a clear
distinction between reduced and full dimension witnesses
has been made. Reduced dimension witnesses have been
shown to be able to certify more randomness. Min-
entropies of several protocols, that had not been con-
sidered previously in [22], were evaluated.
Recently a new method that allows to lower-bound
the randomness obtained in a SDI scheme directly, using
semi-definite programming, has been introduced in [33].
However, the complexity of the algorithm from [33] in-
creases significantly with the dimension of Hilbert space
while in our case the same computation provides a bound
for all dimensions.
It remains an open question, what are the conditions
on a dimension witness under that the adversary has no
gain in using the mixed strategy rather than P.
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